This is part two of Nick Clegg's speech. Click here to read part one. 

The Terms of Intervention: Self-defence

We should start from first principles. Being good internationalists does not mean abandoning our national interests. Britain’s first priority must remain the security and prosperity of the British people.

Where those interests are infringed by acts of aggression from others we maintain our right to respond. The principle of self-defence is enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

It is our unambiguous right, and we must always be ready to exercise it. That right applies not just to aggressor states – but also to terrorist attacks.

The Taliban had served as both breeding ground and training ground to al-Qaeda terrorists, including the 9/11 hijackers.

So, following that terrible September morning when the World Trade Centre was attacked and sixty seven British citizens were among the thousands murdered – we were right to respond.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “an armed attack against one or more” member states “shall be considered an attack against them all”.

This was an attack against us all by state-sponsored terrorism.

And Britain was right to be part of the military response.

It was right to invade Afghanistan, to remove the Taliban from power and now to work with Afghans to establish the basis of a new civil society.

Precautionary intervention

If the principle of self defence against an aggressor is relatively clear, it is the more complex issue of precautionary intervention that is being contested and expanded in foreign affairs today.

Intervention that is, or purports to be, defensive – but nonetheless comes before an attack by an aggressor.

In a thoughtful article in last week’s Guardian, based on his new book, Philip Bobbit turned his attention to this issue.

He separated precautionary intervention into its three strands.

First, pre-emption –

The well-established and legal doctrine of military action in the face of an imminent attack.

Second, preventative war –

Initiated in the belief that armed conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable and that postponement of it will be of tangible disadvantage to the state contemplating action.

Bobbit rightly points out that preventative war has, historically, been considered illicit.

As it was in its most recent incarnation: the invasion of Iraq.

And third, preclusive intervention –

This justifies force on the basis that a state has radically compromised its sovereignty by its own acts.

And that it has refused to right the wrongs it has committed. This may involve the state threatening international security by violating international law and refusing to abide by UN resolutions. Or threatening the security of its own people by means of illegal persecution, or even wilful neglect.

And it entitles others in the international community to sanction the offending state through either economic or military measures.

It was this nascent doctrine that justified our intervention in Kosovo nine years ago. Slobodan Milosevic was actively persecuting Kosovars, and the international community had the moral right to intervene.

Tony Blair himself famously made the case for humanitarian intervention in his Chicago speech that same year.

The messy reality of our current military commitments – not least the unjustified invasion of Iraq – has put the UK on the back foot.

This is tragic. Exactly at a time when we should be strengthening the doctrine of liberal interventionism, the legacy of New Labour`s disastrous intervention in Iraq has weakened our political and moral authority to do so.

It has been left to others – notably the Canadians – to nurture that idea and the result is the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P.

R2P

I believe firmly in this doctrine. It is time for Britain to do all we can to promote and support it.

Adopted by the UN’s 2005 World Summit, the R2P states that if a country is unwilling or unable to carry out its responsibility to prevent abuses of its own citizens, that responsibility must be transferred to the international community.

In turn, the international community must then attempt to solve those problems – by peaceful means, initially – including dialogue, diplomatic pressure, and economic sanctions.

Military force remains available as a means of last resort.

Canada’s International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty proposed that six conditions traditionally associated with just war theory must be met before an act of extraordinary intervention could be justified.

First, any intervention should be based on just cause. Second, it must have the right intention, rather than serving hidden ends. Third, intervention should always be a last resort.
Fourth, it must be sanctioned by legitimate authority. Fifth, a response must be of proportional means to the breach. Sixth – and this must not be forgotten – any intervention must have a reasonable chance of success.

I have no doubt, for example, that there is now a moral case – under R2P principles - for intervention in Zimbabwe.

With the announcement yesterday by the MDC opposition party that they would no longer be contesting the second round of the Presidential Election, Robert Mugabe’s neutering of his country’s political freedoms is complete.

Since the first round of voting – clearly won by Morgan Tsvingarai – chaos has been unleashed.

Aid agencies have been banned from distributing food. Countless opposition supporters have been murdered. With thousands more beaten, intimidated and driven from their homes.

And Mugabe himself threatened to wage war on his own people if he were to lose an election he always had every intention of rigging to his own benefit.

The international community has ample justification to step in. But the extent to which we can act is restricted by the chance of success for our actions. There is, for example, no regional support for any kind of military intervention.

So it would be wrong to attempt any form of military intervention.

How to help Zimbabwe

But that doesn’t mean we should give up. There are other ways to influence Zanu PF.

Three weeks ago I urged the Prime Minister to warn Mugabe that unless established conditions were met for a free and fair election, the UK would work with others to cut off access to the foreign currency that sustains his rule.

That is now one of the few measures that Mugabe would truly fear.

Cutting off foreign remittances is a serious step with serious consequences. I know that it would hurt the ordinary Zimbabweans who rely on remittances from friends and family abroad.

But the fact remains that access to foreign currency is the only thing that enables the regime to function – and therefore the only thing that sustains Mugabe in power. 

It is now too late for free and fair elections in Zimbabwe. But it is not too late for Britain to act within the EU, the UN and, crucially, with countries in the Southern African region to act decisively against Mugabe.

President Mbeki of South Africa must move beyond his reluctance to act and threaten to restrict electricity supplies into Zimbabwe.

Chaos in Zimbabwe will worsen an already acute refugee problem in South Africa. South Africa as the dominant power in the region has every interest to see Mugabe leave Zimbabwe for good.

We must work actively with South Africa to persuade them of the need to be utterly uncompromising towards Mugabe, for the sake of the region as well as Zimbabwe itself.

Beyond R2P

I don’t believe that the R2P principles should be the end point in our thinking. The text adopted by the 2005 World Summit sanctions intervention only when a state commits an active crime against its own people. Or fails – or is unable – to act to stop armed conflict.

But inaction on the part of a state can be equally devastating in non-conflict situations. Earlier this year, the Burmese authorities refused to allow international aid distributors to access those communities who had been hit by the cyclone.

The state authorities preferred to allow their own citizens to starve and fall victim to illness than to accept support from the west. That is an outrage.

If we are willing to take action to protect innocent citizens from state persecution I do not believe that it is morally right to abandon other citizens to the lethal and malicious negligence of their governments. So I believe that the R2P principles should be revisited.

The point at which the international community should consider intervention is not just at times of conflict, but also when a state intentionally permits extreme and unnecessary suffering that it has the power to stop.

Britain and the World

Extending the definition of R2P does of course open the door to increased pressures on the international community.

And there is no denying that there has been an ad hoc approach to implementing the Responsibility to Protect, as it stands.

But that should be a call to action rather than a cause for reticence.

If we are serious about implementing the Responsibility to Protect – whether or not we expand its definition – we need to build the institutional framework that will allow it.

The United Nations should continue to develop this doctrine, so that it is clear and understood by the international community.

And it should be the first port of call to sanction an errant state.

There may be times when it is nonetheless impossible to obtain a Resolution from the Security Council because political interests mean that it would be blocked by permanent members.

The authority of the United Nations is vital and we must always be wary of proceeding without its explicit authority.

But we must recognise that it remains a flawed organisation in need of reform. Too often dominated by individual national interests.

In considering action without UN authority, we have to find a way to distinguish between situations where a minority seeks to prevent the world from taking appropriate military action - as the Russians sought to do over Kosovo - from those where a minority wants to take inappropriate military action -as the Americans and UK did over Iraq in 2003.

We must never confuse the two. And we need to assess who we can work with to best achieve shared ends. The United States will surely remain our closest bilateral ally.

And where it intervenes, within the rule of law, and with our support, we should be open to working with it – through UN forces, Nato, or other structures.

But we must aim to be real partners with the US, not subservient to the whims of any particular administration.

My own view is that Britain must strive to take a leading role in European deployments. The days of America acting as the world’s policeman are numbered. So we have a strategic responsibility to raise our game in Europe.

European spending on defence remains low, and the capability of European states to act together or individually is small.

But the European Security and Defence Policy has begun to develop a portfolio of achievements grounded in the Franco-British St Malo Declaration of ten years ago.

Today, the French, alongside the Irish and others, comprise a positive peacekeeping force in Chad. And there is huge potential for Britain to play in leading the development and integration of Europe’s humanitarian and peacekeeping capacity.

I do not share the reticence of those who fear greater cooperation European defence policy. Of course the EU should not undermine NATO in any way.

But if the prize from greater defence cooperation in Europe, is a Europe better able to stand on its own two feet and contribute to greater stability so be it.

Certainly, Britain will not encourage our European partners to contribute more forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere by carping from the sidelines. We do need more commitment from other NATO Member States in Afghanistan. But that is not a reason in itself to shun greater cooperation with our allies.

In Nicolas Sarkozy Britain may prove to have an unprecedented ally for leading Europe on these issues.

The proposals for greater cooperation between the British and French navies are the kind of bold thinking that Europe needs.

More sharing of defence capabilities between NATO and European allies is inevitable if we are to continue to demand access to the range of platforms we have traditionally used without committing to a vastly increased defence budget.

We should embrace that. That is where Britain can lead in Europe.

Conclusion

As a liberal and as an internationalist, I believe strongly in Britain’s role as a force both for peace and for justice in the world.

But at this moment of global flux, and on the back of our Iraq experience, it is time for Britain to reassess our military priorities.

We should of course continue to offer a robust defence of our national interests. But we should lead the debate on reforming and developing the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, and to working within the United Nations to maximise its effect.

Realpolitik will always limit the capacity of individual states and international institutions to create a fairer world.

But that should never stop us from trying.