The UK’s nuclear deterrent

This spokesperson’s paper first sets out security challenges for the UK involving nuclear weapon states and nuclear risk. In Section 2, the paper sets out the current position of the UK Government, and  details the ongoing construction of the Trident replacement Dreadnought-class submarines.

The following section discusses whether the security challenges (outlined in Section 1) necessitate the UK’s retention of credible, minimum nuclear deterrent. We conclude that they do - and that a change in nuclear posture at this time would not be credible. In Section 4, the paper sets out ways in which the UK Government can pursue the broader disarmament agenda amidst a challenging strategic environment.

The conference motion relating to this paper can be found here.

Foreword - Richard Foord MP

As the new Liberal Democrat defence spokesperson, I wanted to review and update the party spokesperson’s paper originally due for consideration at Autumn Conference 2022. I would like to thank Jamie Stone MP, my predecessor, for his excellent work on the last version of this paper.

Clearly, in the six months since the paper was first published, much has changed in UK domestic politics - and also worldwide. Ukraine has now liberated swathes of its territory; over half of all the land taken by the Russians in February 2022 is under Ukrainian control once more. Some things, however, remain similar. At the time of writing, we still face warnings of the potential of a new front in the north of the country; of Russia capturing towns such as Soledar; and Putin’s veiled threats of the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, such alarming threats have continued these past few months.

It was in September, following the partial mobilisation in Russia, that Putin memorably said, “[t]his is not a bluff”, as he alluded to the potential use of nuclear weapons in defence of Russian territory, territory which according to the Russians now includes the four illegal annexed Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia. As Ukrainian successes have occurred, questions were raised about whether Putin could resort to nuclear weapons, if he was to feel he faced an existential defeat. The New START nuclear arms control treaty between the US and Russia has frayed, with Russia suspending its participation. Reports in the media suggest that senior Russian military figures have discussed the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

And looking beyond the scope of the Russia-Ukraine war, 2022 did not give huge cause for optimism in relation to the geopolitical context, nor for disarmament initiatives. The 2022 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty ended without agreement on a substantive text, thanks in part to Russian opposition. We were left with a very real indicator of the potential for future conflict in the South China Sea, when China conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait which crossed the median line, following Nancy Pelosi’s visit. Focus on Iran has also been renewed in response to the dreadful repression by the authorities there - a repressive reaction to brave Iranian women protesting following the murder of Mahsa Amini in September 2022 – and the lack of progress in relation to the JCPOA. Then there is the concerning manner in which Russia and Iran are now cooperating - Iran supplying drones in return for what has been described, one suspects euphemistically, as ‘advanced military components’.